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Abstract
This analytical essay looks at the myriad of ways innocent people are wrongfully convicted and how the
criminal justice system fails to truly reach a fair and equitable result. The article looks at how at the initial
stages of a criminal proceeding, a defendant can be prejudiced to the point of sufficient harm to his chances
at being given a fair and impartial judicial proceeding. This article examines how fatal mistakes can be
made and reveals that there can be flaws in the science of DNA testing, including fraud, criminologist bias,
improper laboratory procedures, and human error. This article seeks to point out major factors that can
contribute to an innocent individual being erroneously convicted of a crime and how that happens more
times than one may think.

There is no more serious error or representation of the flaws of the American criminal justice system than when an innocent man, after
spending years on death row, away from his
family, friends, and the life that he knows,
makes that long walk to the death chambers,
says his final goodbyes, is strapped to a bed,
and is lethally injected until his heart stops
beating. Not only has the system, which is
designed to keep criminals away from society, failed by taking an innocent man’s life,
but it has allowed a guilty man to stay on
the streets, dwelling among unsuspecting
citizens.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution clearly establish that
everyone is entitled to the due process of the
law; this concept precedes the creation of
our institutions (Powell v. Alabama, 1932). Due
process “embodies one of the broadest and
most far reaching guarantees of personal and
property rights. It is necessary for the enjoyment of life, liberty and property” (Powell v.
Alabama, 1932). While the courts have not set
out a standard definition of due process in a

criminal proceeding, it generally consists of
the right to a fair trial, conducted in a competent manner; right to be present at trial;
right to an impartial jury; and the right to be
heard in one’s own defense. In Powell, the U.S.
Supreme Court illustrated that a defendant in
a criminal case is afforded due process when
there is a defined law, a competent court,
accusation in due form, notice of the charges
against the defendant and the right to answer
those charges, a trial conducted according to
established procedure, and the assurance that
the defendant will be discharged if found not
guilty. Opponents of the death penalty argue
that the process in which a defendant is tried
violates this fundamental right that the framers of the Constitution gave the citizens of
our country. In light of recent exonerations of
many men and women wrongfully convicted,
that argument carries weight.
Many jurisdictions are working toward
reducing wrongful convictions—especially
in capital murder cases. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Kansas v. Marsh
(2006), which upheld Kansas’s death penalty
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law, may prove to be more of a hurdle and a
hindrance than an improvement in decreasing
wrongful convictions: “Kansas law provides
that if a unanimous jury finds that aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall
be imposed” (“Sentencing,” Kansas Statutes
Annotated, 1995; repealed 2010). The Kansas
Supreme Court found that the law violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution because in the event of equipoise, the mitigating factors weigh equally
with the aggravating circumstances; in this
event, the death penalty must be imposed.
Marsh argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it established a presumption
of death. However, the U.S. Supreme Court
overruled the Kansas decision and upheld
the constitutionality of the statute. The Court
reasoned that the statute actually works in
the defendant’s favor because it requires “the
State to bear the burden of proving to the jury,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravators
are not outweighed by mitigators and that a
sentence of death is therefore appropriate; it
places no additional evidentiary burden on
the capital defendant” (Kansas v. Marsh, 2006).
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, noted
that “reversal of an erroneous conviction
on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning of
an innocent condemnee through executive
clemency, demonstrates not the failure of
the system but its success” (Kansas v. Marsh,
2006). Even so, how can a system be just if the
innocent man has to fight for his life? If one
is innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, how are innocent people being
convicted?
Scalia praised the criminal justice system
for functioning correctly when an innocent
person is pardoned through appeal or clemency. While it is favorable that an innocent
man is released, the detriment a wrongful
conviction can have on a man’s life and liberty, in addition to the stigma that is attached
to convicted criminals, is irreversible. Anyone
can agree with Scalia that justice is served
68

when an innocent man is exonerated from
a crime that he did not commit. However,
allowing an innocent man to remain incarcerated for years does not prove that the criminal
justice system functions correctly. Our system
provides that any man that is accused of a
crime is innocent until he is found guilty by a
jury of his peers beyond a reasonable doubt.
It follows logically, therefore, that when an
innocent man is convicted, there must be
error somewhere in the judicial process when
an innocent man is convicted.
Unfortunately, it is a sad fact that due process violations are infiltrating the system at
every stage of the judicial process. To highlight some of these violations, this article will
examine real-life cases in which an innocent
man was convicted and, subsequently, his
conviction was questioned.

The Arrest and Investigation: Police
and Prosecutorial Misconduct in
the Early Stages of a Case
A fundamental principle in criminal procedure is that you cannot make an arrest
without probable cause (Book v. Ohio, 1964).
Considering the number of convictions that
are being overturned due to actual innocence,
a fair question to ask is “How was an innocent
man arrested in the first place?” The case of
Ruben Cantu highlights how police misconduct may have led to a wrongful arrest, and
even worse, to an innocent man’s execution.
Ruben Montoya Cantu: Executed
August 24, 1993
There is more than one reason why Ruben
Cantu should be alive today. When two
young men broke into a house and shot at
Pedro Gomez and Juan Moreno, killing Pedro
and severely injuring Juan, Ruben was just
17 years old. He was also 17 at the time he
was arrested for capital murder, and he was
26 when he was executed for a crime that the
surviving victim, the co-defendant, and other
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people from his community say that he never
committed. Cantu claimed his innocence up
until his final moments of his life, just after
midnight August 24, 1993.
There was talk at Cantu’s high school that he
was the shooter. Based on this hearsay, officers took photos of Juan Moreno, the surviving victim. As he lay in bed recovering from
being shot over 15 times, Officer Bill Ewell
showed Moreno pictures of Cantu and other
Mexican men, but Moreno insisted that none
of the photos matched the robber. The officers
tried several other times to show photos of
Cantu, but every time Moreno insisted it was
not Cantu who did the shooting.
The case appeared to be closed until four
months later. Cantu was at a bar and was
involved in a physical altercation with an offduty officer. After the officer flashed his gun,
Cantu fired his gun at the officer. The officer
was injured, but all charges against Cantu
were dismissed because he was acting in
self-defense. This act infuriated other police
officers as well as Officer Ewell. This incident
prompted Ewell to reopen the Gomez murder
case. Ewell went back to Juan Moreno with
photographs of Cantu, but this time Moreno
was told that law enforcement had solid evidence that Cantu was the murderer and that
they needed him to testify in court. Moreno
eventually did testify, and Cantu was convicted on the basis of the in-court identification by Moreno. Moreno was the only testifying witness against Cantu.
It also must be noted that, at the time, Moreno
was a 15-year-old undocumented person
living illegally in the United States, and he
spoke no English. He must have been terrified at the police coming to his home multiple times attempting to get him to identify a
person as a shooter when he initially stood by
his statement that the shooter was not Ruben
Cantu. The record also reflected that Cantu
had what appeared to be a solid alibi: he was
in a different city on the day of the shooting.

He also had no prior convictions and had not
had any problems with the law.
Ruben Cantu’s case is not the only example
of how the police can manipulate an investigation: “Innocent defendants are sometimes
pressured into confessing to crimes they did
not commit, especially when the prospect of a
plea bargain is presented to them” (Blackerby,
2003, p. 1190).

The Hearing: The Right to an
Impartial Proceeding
It is a right that anyone accused of a crime be
heard by an impartial, competent judiciary,
and it is essential that the appearance of justice be present throughout the entire judicial
process (Bradshaw v. McCotter, 1986, p. 1329).
But recent studies are proving that this right
is more of a fiction than fact. While the circumstances of each capital case are different,
so are the methods being used to convict.
Thus, there is no single factor that can be specifically identified that has led to erroneous
convictions. Blackerby (2003) lists some of the
factors that can be specified as variables in
these wrongful convictions: (1) faulty forensics (also known as “junk science”); (2) prosecutorial, judicial, and police misconduct;
(3) racial prejudice; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel (predominantly harmful to
impoverished defendants who take court-appointed counsel) (p. 1186). Blackerby also cites
a study examining the most common errors
in capital cases between 1973 and 1995 and
found that the rate of prejudicial error was 68%
(p. 1186). However, the Supreme Court held
in Bordenkircher v. Hays (1978) that a coerced
plea bargain does not violate due process
(p. 365).
Evidence Gathering
A 1996 Department of Justice study reported
that 28 persons had been released from prison
as a result of post-trial DNA testing (p. 2). The
state’s expert witness in four of these cases
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was Fred Zain. Even though Zain had been
discredited by the West Virginia Supreme
Court and was tried on charges of theft of
services based upon his routine perjurious
testimony, Texas has continued to fight and
save convictions supported by Zain’s testimony that has been shown to be unreliable
and fallacious.
Another known case of an expert witness lying
on the stand is forensic scientist Joyce Gilchrist
in Oklahoma. During her 21-year career at
the Oklahoma City Police Department, she
helped the prosecution send 23 defendants to
death row (Kofman, 2001). All of these cases
were re-examined once it was revealed that
her testimony was flawed or false. Tragically,
11 of the men had already been executed.
Recently, generally accepted methods of
forensic testing have come under close examination. Unfortunately, when these types of
methods have become so prevalent in the
courtroom, how does one effectively exclude
them at this point? Moreover, what happens
when unsubstantiated scientific theory is
allowed into evidence at trial?
In 2004, Lavelle Davis was sentenced to
45 years after Stephen McKasson explained to
jurors that lip prints left at the crime scene on
a piece of duct tape linked him to the crime.
As one juror put it, “the lip print . . . ’proved
that he had actually committed the crime’”
(McRoberts, Mills, & Possley, 2004). The only
problem: the assertion about the lip print was
not true. These are just some examples of
how easily forensic science’s false impression
of infallibility has the power to distort the
system of true justice.
The legal system, in its pursuit of justice,
cannot count on local forensic labs to provide
competent forensic testing or accept DNA,
ballistics, fingerprint, odontology, bullet
lead analysis, or any other “science” without closely examining the scientific methods
involved in obtaining the evidence.
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We live in an age where the media undeniably
can have a profound influence on the general
public and jurors. Television shows such as
CSI and Law & Order, which are filled with
every new and old method of forensic testing,
have the general public convinced that these
methods are infallible.
DNA Testing
DNA testing can be an essential link between
a crime and convicting the right person; however, a defendant’s ability to access DNA testing is a procedural challenge to proving his
innocence. While proponents of DNA testing
have done an excellent job making it appear
to be reliable, the evidence has been under
close scrutiny in the legal and scientific communities (Faigman, Kaye, Saks, & Sanders,
2002, pp. 208-209).
In cases in which innocent men were exonerated by post-conviction DNA tests, misleading forensic science came in second place
behind mistaken eyewitness testimony as a
cause of false conviction (Nethercott, 2003;
Scheck, Neufield, & Dwyer, 2000). Even if a
DNA method of testing is generally accepted,
there are other factors that must be called into
question. These depend on the specific circumstances in each individual case. Flaws in
the science of DNA testing are not the only
source of improper conclusions; fraud, criminologist bias, improper lab procedures, and
human error exacerbate the problem.
Criminologist Bias
While DNA analysis relies heavily on computer equipment, interpreting the results is
occasionally determined by an examiner’s
subjective judgment. One must look to psychology to understand how bias plays a role
in scientific testing: “An elementary principle of modern psychology is that the desires
and expectations people possess influence
their perceptions and interpretations of what
they observe” (Risinger, Saks, Thompson, &
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Rosenthal, 2002, p. 6). Since this holds true
when the observer has a mild expectation, it
is understandable that when someone has a
strong desire to see a particular result, there
is an increased likelihood that it will be seen
(p. 6).
In criminal cases, this poses a serious problem
when DNA is interpreted by laboratory workers who have an underlying desire to play an
integral part in crime solving: “When faced
with an ambiguous situation, where the call
could go either way, crime lab analysis frequently slant their interpretations in ways that
support prosecution theories” (Thompson,
Ford, Doom, Raymer, & Krane, 2003). A simple
examination of a crime lab’s notes has revealed that analysts are often aware of more
facts than necessary to make a scientific judgment about evidence. Even more dangerous,
they may be aware of which results will aid
the prosecution’s case and those that will hurt
it (Thompson et al., 2003). One analyst’s notes
stated, “Suspect known Crip gang member
keeps ‘skating’ on charges—never serves
time. This robbery he gets hit in head with
bar stool—left blood trail. [Detective] Miller
wants to connect this guy to scene w/DNA”
(Thompson et al., 2003).
Directors of crime labs in Cleveland, Houston
and Montana have all been accused of giving
misleading testimony which led to false convictions (Nethercott, 2003). An astounding
number of these cases have come to light and
cast serious doubt on DNA testing, despite its
benefits.
Improper Lab Procedures
In 2003, the Houston Police Department was
forced to close the DNA and serology section of its crime labs after television journalists exposed serious flaws in its procedures:
“Two men who were falsely incriminated
by botched lab work have been released
after subsequent DNA testing proved their
innocence” (Thompson & Nethercott, 2004).
Unfortunately, what happened in Houston

is not an isolated incident. California,
Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington State
also have documented cases of error.
Generally, these problems are due to crosscontamination, mislabeling, and human mistakes (Thompson & Nethercott, 2004).
In addition to their bias, criminologists far
too often form conclusions about evidence
based on beliefs and assertions they derive
from training, knowledge, and experience but
have not been adequately tested to be supported by concrete scientific data (Thompson
& Nethercott, 2004). Some criminologist training has come from the directors of their labs;
the same directors who have been found
guilty of misrepresenting testing in favor of
the prosecution.
Fingerprint Analysis
Fingerprint analysis has been finding its way
into criminal trials since 1910 when the first
man was convicted by matching his fingerprints to prints left at the scene. Examiners
proffer that the craft is flawless, even denying
the possibility that a trained examiner who
follows procedure could reach a wrong conclusion (Thompson & Cole, 2005). The problem is that fingerprint analysis makes sense
because there is the belief that no two fingerprints are alike; therefore, the fingerprint
evidence is inherently correct: “The real question is not whether all fingerprints are different, but, rather, how accurate are fingerprint
examiners at matching the small, fragmentary prints you find at crime scenes” (Humes,
2004). There have been false fingerprint identifications, but professionals in the field attribute it to incompetent examiners, thus, allowing the method to remain perfect (Thompson
& Cole, 2005).
The debate behind fingerprinting is led by the
question “What is the science?” Simon Cole,
a Social Science professor at the University
of California, Irvine, answers the question by
explaining “No one knows because there has
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never been a scientific study to find out. They
have never allowed it” (Humes, 2004). Many
leading fingerprint examiners have agreed
with Cole’s response. The reality is there is
no concrete standard used to determine what
portion of a print must be recovered before it
is suitable for comparison. Even more troubling is that there is no significant research
available to say whether or not people share
fingerprint patterns: “In 1995, one of the only
independent proficiency tests of fingerprint
examiners in U.S. crime labs found that nearly
a quarter reported false positives” (McRoberts
et al., 2004).

Forensic Odontology
Bite-Mark Analysis

The Case of Brandon Mayfield
In 2004, federal prosecutors claimed they
were 100% sure of the positive identification of fingerprints lifted from a bag linking
a Portland, Oregon, attorney to the Madrid
Tower bombing case (Wax & Schatz, 2004,
p. 6). A few weeks later, the FBI was embarrassed to admit that it was wrong due to an
erroneous fingerprint comparison (p. 6). If
investigators from Spain had not linked the
fingerprints to a known terrorist, Brandon
Mayfield, the Oregon attorney who had never
even been to Spain, could still be locked up
in a federal correctional facility. This incident
disproved the theory that errors result from
examiner incompetence because three of the
most highly experienced examiners working
for the FBI all came to the same erroneous
conclusion (Thompson & Cole, 2005).
Several theories came out of the Mayfield
case. One in particular raised the issue of bias.
Mayfield was an immediate suspect because he
had converted to Islam, had an Egyptian wife,
had military training, and had represented a
member of a group of Muslims suspected of
terrorist conspiracy (Thompson & Cole, 2005).
In addition to this possible instance of bias, in
1997, an investigation conducted on the FBI
proved that “FBI examiners had relied on collateral evidence when making key ‘scientific’
determinations” (Thompson & Cole, 2005).
72

In light of the turnover of the Mayfield case,
the FBI reviewed the case and issued a report.
Part of the report blames “confirmation bias,”
which is when one perceives what one expects
or desires (Thompson & Cole, 2005). The
report also concluded that because the initial
examiner was highly respected, the two subsequent examiners tended to agree without a
thoroughly complete and accurate examination. As with DNA testing, human bias can
negatively impact the outcome.

Bite-mark analysis is an extension of odontology which entered forensics in 1970. Usually,
dental experts are used to identify the
remains of unknown corpses using dental
records. However, evaluating bite marks frequently occurs in violent cases in which the
alleged perpetrator leaves bite marks on his
victim. Judges allow forensic dentists to testify regarding bite marks despite “having no
accepted way to measure their rate of error or
the benefit of peer review” (McRoberts et al.,
2004). Bite-mark analysis also lacks reviewed
research and scientific validation, which are
essential elements of distinguishing science
from guesswork (McRoberts & Mills, 2004).
During the trial of Ted Bundy, forensic dental
experts testified for the prosecutors that bite
marks left on one victim’s body was a match
to Bundy’s teeth. Twenty-five years after the
trial, the prosecutor’s expert confessed “that
the Bundy trial left a problematic legacy. It
catapulted bite-mark evidence to the point
where [many] were saying, ‘A bite mark is as
good as a fingerprint’” (McRoberts & Mills,
2004). Now, he claims that this belief is wrong
and warns against using it (McRoberts &
Mills, 2004).
Bite-mark analysis is truly an opinion, with
no supporting mathematical or scientific
research supporting a human’s observation.
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While a bite mark and a wound can be similar, one should never assume that they are
identical.
Ray Krone: Spent Over 10 Years in Prison
for a Murder He Did Not Commit
Ray Krone was charged with murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault in 1991, but his conviction was overturned, and he was released
10 years later (Hansen, 2005, p. 48). Kim
Ancona’s naked body was found laid across
the men’s bathroom of the bar where she
worked. She had been stabbed 11 times. There
were few clues to help investigators find the
attacker. There was no semen, and there were
no fingerprints; however, the police did find
bite marks on the victim’s neck and breast.
Krone became a suspect because he was a
regular customer at the bar and a friend of
Kim’s. After taking a styrofoam impression of
Krone’s teeth, he was charged with murder.
Krone, who was a 35-year-old mailman, had
no prior convictions. During trial, an expert
testified that the impression from Krone’s
teeth was a match to the bite marks left on the
victim’s body. Despite maintaining his innocence, Krone was convicted and sentenced to
death. Three years later, his conviction was
overturned; and he was granted a new trial
based on a procedural technicality. But, once
again, Krone was convicted and sentenced
to life in prison due to the bite-mark expert’s
testimony.

recent studies have revealed that the powder
does not stay confined to the shooter’s body.
Forensic scientists have been testifying that
evidence of gunpowder is conclusive to establish that the person was the shooter.
Today, many scientists have done a significant amount of research to disprove this
claim. Peter DeForest of John Jay College of
Criminal Justice in New York argues, “I don’t
think [gunshot residue testing is] a very valuable technique to begin with. It’s great chemistry. It’s great microscopy. The question is,
how did the particle get there?” (Mejia, 2005).
The answer is, as modern research has proven,
GSR can be transferred through a number of
means.
At the Institute of Criminalistics in Prague,
Czech Republic, scientists found that a nonshooter may come into contact with GSR
without going near a firearm (Mejia, 2005).
The scientists fired a gun in a closed room and
then collected particles two meters from the
place of the shooting: “They detected unique
particles up to eight minutes after a shot was
fired, suggesting that someone [who] entered
the scene after a shooting could have more
particles on them than a shooter who runs
away immediately” (Mejia, 2005).

Gunshot Residue Testing

Several police departments throughout the
country have conducted their own internal investigations on GSR; all of them have
seen similar, disturbing results. In 2000, the
Los Angeles County Coroner’s Department
revealed a suspect could become contaminated with GSR by riding in the back of a
police car: “Of 50 samples from the back seats
of patrol cars, they found 45 contained particles consistent with GSR and four had ‘highly
specific’ GSR particles” (Mejia, 2005).

The moment a gun is fired, particles of gunpowder leave the gun. The premise that
gunshot residue (hereinafter GSR) testing
is based on is that the powder blows onto
the shooter’s hands and body (Nethercott &
Thompson, 2005). Although this may be true,

In 2001, after conducting an internal investigation, the Baltimore City Police Department
found high levels of GSR contamination in
areas of the police station where suspects
were processed for GSR collection. Samples
collected from the furniture where suspects

Luckily, traces of saliva were recovered from
the victim’s body. In 2002, a DNA exam was
finally conducted, and Krone’s cry of innocence was finally heard (Hansen, 2005, p. 48).
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were held, surfaces that suspects would
touch, and even the air in the process area
were positive for GSR particles (Nethercott &
Thompson, 2005).
In addition to these findings at the police
station, materials found in the GSR can also
be found in the environment. Fireworks and
industrial tools use materials with compositions similar to those found in GSR particles.
Car mechanics are most likely to be falsely
identified as having GSR on their bodies
because some brake linings contain heavy
metals that may be confused and misidentified as GSR particles (Mejia, 2005).
A main concern is not with how reliable GSR
testing can be, but with the scientific methods
of testing and procedure: “As currently practiced . . . there are no definitive standards for
distinguishing gunshot residue from other
substances” (Nethercott & Thompson, 2005).
Up until 2000, most labs found positive GSR
samples if they detected particles of barium
and antimony. But, studies revealed that
these particles are found in substances in
nature that are completely unrelated to firearms (Nethercott & Thompson, 2005). In 2002,
scientists “identified a substance as ‘unique
GSR’ only if they found a combination of
barium, antimony and lead fused together in
a single particle” (Nethercott & Thompson,
2005). But, yet again, that theory was doubted
after a demonstration that these particles
could be found in brake linings.
If examiners who take the samples from the
suspects would also take control samples
from the area where the suspect was exposed,
this could help detect GSR contamination: “If
GSR can be detected all over the environment
that the suspect has been exposed to, then it
would be foolish to claim that finding GSR
on the suspect is a sure sign that he fired the
gun” (Nethercott & Thompson, 2005). Most
scientists never bother taking a sample from
any other location than the suspect’s hands.
Janine Arvizu, an independent lab auditor
from New Mexico, conducted a reviews of the
74

Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD).
She concluded that “The BCPD lab routinely
reported gunshot residue collected from a
subject’s hands most probably arose from
proximity to a discharging firearm, despite
the fact that comparable levels of gunshot residue were detected in the laboratory’s contamination studies” (Mejia, 2005). Not only was
the BCPD using improper procedures, “the
department’s sole GSR analyst was giving
deceptive and misleading testimony in criminal trials” (Nethercott & Thompson, 2005).
A combination of factors, such as insufficient
scientific proof, inconsistent lab procedures,
and analysts willing to make unsupported
conclusions, makes GSR testing an unreliable
source of forensic science.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
My uneasiness about the verdict in the
Amrine case has to do with the fact that the
defense attorney gave us very little to work
with. . . . I got the impression that when he
was presenting the defense case, he was
meeting witnesses for the very first time.
—Larry Hildebrand, death penalty juror
(the defendant was later exonerated)
The Sixth Amendment provides that anyone
accused of a crime shall enjoy the right “to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”
Although this is a right clearly established
in the U.S. Constitution, most states have
adopted the concept into their states’ constitutions, even though the Supreme Court
has held that, by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment, due process rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
applies to states as well.
Justice Black in Gideon v. Wainwright stated,
The right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is
in ours. From the very beginning, our state
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and national constitutions and laws have laid
great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant
stands equal before the law. This noble ideal
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer
to assist him.

testifying for the defense in open court, stated
that she had lied about the rapes to get herself
out of trouble. The Alabama Supreme Court
upheld the conviction; and only the Chief
Justice, in a vigorous dissent, found that the
trials were unfair and that the boys had been
denied due process of law and equal protection rights (Powell v. Alabama, 1932, p. 50).

Murder trials can be very expensive and time
consuming, and they require a great deal
of experience. Unfortunately, many people
accused of murder are indigent and cannot
afford the best legal representation. Gerry
Spence, one of the most well-known trial
attorneys in America, wrote in his book, The
Smoking Gun, about a woman and her son
accused of murder in Lincoln County, Oregon:

The Supreme Court took the case on appeal
and only looked at the second claim raised:
that the young boys “were denied the right
to counsel with the accustomed incidents of
consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial” (Powell v. Alabama, 1932, p. 50).
Although the court had appointed counsel for
the defendants during arraignment, none was
appointed afterwards. On the day the trial
was to begin, appearing without attorneys,
the boys were never asked if they had counsel
or whether they had been given the opportunity to contact relatives who could have
assisted them in obtaining counsel. The trial
began six days after the indictment: “No one
answered for the defendants or appeared to
represent or defend them” (Powell v. Alabama,
1932, p. 53).

If a trial lawyer won’t take on a murder case
because he doesn’t want to get his hands dirty
or because there isn’t any money in it, the
system fails. It not only fails the accused, it fails
the rest of us. Some day when some fair-haired
prosecutor with the governor’s chair glowing
in his mind’s eye decides to charge one of us or
one of our kids with a crime—well, that hated,
scorned, and damned of the legal profession,
the trial lawyer, better be around to see that we
get a fair trial, and that if we’re innocent, we
walk out of the courtroom free. (p. 3)
It appears that many trial lawyers are keeping
their hands clean, while men and women are
faced with proceedings that do not meet constitutional guarantees.
The Scottsboro Boys
In 1932, seven young African-American males
were sentenced to death for the rape of two
young, white females. At that time, the sentence of rape in Alabama could range from
10 years’ confinement to death. The young,
illiterate boys were arraigned one week after
the alleged rapes took place, and all pled not
guilty. The boys were tried in three separate
trials, and all three were completed in one
single day. One of the rape victims later, while

The morning of the trial, one attorney who
was just there to observe said that he would
represent them if no one else would. The trial
judge allowed him to proceed as the defense
attorney. As the Supreme Court rightfully
found, “During perhaps the most critical
period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their
arraignment until the beginning of their trial,
when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important,
the defendants did not have the aid of counsel
in any real sense, although they were as much
entitled to such aid during that period as at
the trial itself” (Powell v. Alabama, 1932, p. 57).
As noted by the Chief Justice of Alabama’s
dissent, “the appearance was rather pro forma
than zealous and active” (p. 58).
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The Supreme Court held that

(as opposed to inmates serving life or less
than life sentences) is made up of people who
are not distinguished by their crime but by
their lawyer’s ineffectiveness.

[I]n a capital case in which the defendant is
unable to employ counsel and is incapable of
adequately making his own defense because
of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or
the like, it is the duty of the court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as
necessary requisite of due process of law; and
that duty is not discharged by an assignment
at such time or under such circumstances as
to preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case. (Powell v.
Alabama, 1932, p. 71)
Although the Supreme Court did not give
a definite example of what qualifies as adequate representation, it clearly established
that counsel is essential during the investigatory phase of trial in order for an accused
to sufficiently present his defense. The argument, thus, can be made that, in order to be
effective, counsel must do an investigation
before going to trial.
However, we are seeing a disheartening phenomenon in capital murder cases. Defendants
are being sentenced not on the merits of their
cases but on the effectiveness of their counsel:
“A member of the Georgia Board of Pardons
and Paroles has said that if the files of 100
cases punished by death and 100 punished by
life were shuffled, it would be impossible to
sort them out by sentence based upon information in the files about the crime and the
offender” (Bright, 1994, p. 1840).
There are countless examples of murder cases
that are factually similar but with opposite
sentencing results. This means that capital
murder defendants are not being sentenced
based on the merits of the case or severity of the
crime but, rather, on whether their trial counsel was effective in presenting their defense.
There is a right to counsel during hearings,
but there is no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. The consequence of poor
legal representation in capital murder cases is
that a large population of death row inmates
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In 1984, the Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington held that the proper standard to
determine whether counsel was effective was
whether he was reasonably effective: “The
benchmark for judging whether any claim
of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result” (p. 686). To establish ineffectiveness,
a defendant must show, first, that the counsel’s performance was deficient, and second,
that the errors were so serious that counsel
was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment (p. 687). Unfortunately,
case law reveals that the courts have set an
extremely low standard for defense counsel
to meet.
According to Bright (1994),
Death sentences have been imposed in cases in
which defense lawyers had not even read the
state’s death penalty statute or did not know
that a capital trial is bifurcated into separate
determinations of guilt and punishment.1
State trial judges and prosecutors—who have
taken oaths to uphold the law,2 including the
Sixth Amendment—have allowed capital trials
to proceed and death sentences to be imposed
even when defense counsel fought among
themselves or presented conflicting defenses
for the same client; referred to the clients by
a racial slur3; or cross-examined a witness
whose direct testimony counsel missed because
he was parking his car, slept through portions
of the trial,4 or was intoxicated during trial.5
Appellate courts often review and decide capital cases on the basis of appellate briefs that
would be rejected in a first-year legal writing
course in law school. (pp. 1842-1843)
It has been over 70 years since the Supreme
Court found in Powell that an attorney is

Law Enforcement Executive Forum • 2015 • 15(4)

ineffective if he fails to conduct any investigation but merely accompanies the accused to
court. It is an abomination that our legal profession renders our colleagues effective when
they have done nothing more than sit next to
their client in court. Representation in many
trials today is no better than that provided to
the boys of Scottsboro. The only difference is
that today we are holding these members of
the Bar to be effective counsel.
The financial costs of defending a capital
case are extremely high. Paying for court-appointed counsel is a burden that the State
bears, thus, naturally, it tries to keep costs to
a minimum. However, we must also keep in
mind that a prosecutor’s role is not to see that
a conviction is made, but to see that justice is
served. Justice is not served when a defendant
whose life is at stake is not afforded quality
representation:
So long as juries and judges are equally
deprived of critical information and the Bill
of Rights is ignored in the most emotionally
and politically charged cases due to deficient
legal representation, the courts should not be
authorized to impose the extreme and irrevocable penalty of death. Otherwise, the death
penalty will continue to be imposed, not upon
those who commit the worst crimes, but upon
those who have the misfortune to be assigned
the worst lawyers. (Bright, 1994, p. 1883)

Conclusion
The enemy was the endemic meanness of the
system. Every day the state hauls in the dregs
of society. These miscreants fill the courtrooms
with the sounds of their contrived excuses and
their tinny pleas for mercy. We despise them
for their injuries and pain they impose upon
us. The accused are mean. Murder is mean.
And meanness is contagious. The system has
caught it. (Spence, 2003, p. 27)
If our society is to continue to execute criminals, we must ensure that every person

accused of a capital crime is afforded the best
legal representation and a fair, impartial trial.
At a minimum, this is what the constitutional
right to due process provides. Taking away
someone’s life as a penalty for committing a
crime is the most serious and final punishment. Unlike other sentences, once the execution is completed, it cannot be undone.
Therefore, regardless of our moral and political beliefs, the death penalty is not for those
who are innocent. It is the role of the criminal process to separate the innocent from the
guilty. Unfortunately, the system has not been
perfect, or even close to it.
I disagree with Justice Scalia’s argument
that “reversal of an erroneous conviction
on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning of
an innocent condemnee through executive
clemency, demonstrates not the failure of
the system but its success” (Kansas v. Marsh,
2006). Of the hundreds of guilty men who are
rightfully convicted, if only one innocent man
had to spend years on death row until his
innocence was proven, there would be a plausible argument that our system was fair and
constitutional. However, the number of men
and women who have been released from
death row due to post-conviction innocence
is devastating. Habeas relief should not be the
stage of a case where innocence is determined;
the trial should. Proving innocence through
appeal should be the exception, not the rule.
When an innocent man is convicted, two
severe injustices occur: (1) an innocent man
loses a basic human right that is guaranteed
to him by our Constitution: life and liberty;
and (2) a guilty man is free to dwell in society,
living in our communities and being capable
of committing more heinous crimes.
My concern is not that the structure of our
system is inadequate but that there are so
many hurdles placed in the way of the accused
on his quest to prove his innocence. Hurdles
such as ineffective assistance of counsel, judicial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, and inadequate forensic evidence being used against
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him. If we are going to take away a man’s life
by imposing such a final punishment as the
death penalty, at the very least we must do
so firmly adhering to the guidelines of our
Constitution.

Faigman, D., Kaye D., Saks, M., & Sanders,
J. (Eds.). (2002). Modern scientific evidence:
The law and science of expert testimony (Vol.
3, pp. 208-209). Minneapolis, MN: West
Publishing.

Endnotes

Hansen, M. (2005). The uncertain science
of evidence: Some testimony from expert
witnesses in criminal trials is having trouble standing up to tougher scrutiny from
the courts. American Bar Association Journal,
91(7), 48-53.

1

“An Alabama defense lawyer asked for time
between the guilt and penalty phases so
that he could read the state’s death penalty
statute.” (State v. Smith, 1990).

2

“A judge in a Florida case took a defense
lawyer in chambers during the penalty phase
to explain what it was about. The lawyer
responded: ‘I’m at a total loss. I really don’t
know what to do in this type of proceeding.
If I had been through one, I would, but I’ve
never handled one except this time.’” (Douglas
v. Wainwright, 1983)

3

4

5

Defendant was called a “little nigger boy” by
his own counsel during closing arguments
(Goodwin v. Balkcom, 1982).
“A judge in Harris County, Texas, responded
to a capital defendant’s complaints about his
lawyer sleeping during trial at which death
was imposed, stating: ‘The Constitution does
not state that the lawyer has to be awake.’”
Bright, 1994)
Counsel, an alcoholic, was arrested on his way
to court and found to be well over the legal
limit, but the court was not willing to presume
ineffective assistance of counsel against
attorneys who were under the influence
(People v. Garrison, 1986).
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